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Introduction
Few would contend that elections have been neglected as objects of study
by Canada’s polling and academic communities. After all, there were no
less than 55 national polls published over the 56 days of the 2006 fed-
eral election campaign, and pre-election polls have increased their pro-
file in campaign media coverage for each successive Canadian election
over the past two decades ~Andersen, 2000; Brown and Kay, 1997098!.
Similarly, national surveys of voters have been conducted by multi-
university research teams during or following 13 of the past 14 Cana-
dian elections. Given this longstanding interest and expertise in Canadian
elections, then, it might surprise outside observers to learn that Canada
has virtually no history of “exit polling” as part of its election coverage
and analysis.
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“Exit polls” take their name from their timing in the election cam-
paign: they are surveys of randomly selected voters interviewed as they
leave their respective polling locations. An exit poll was first tried in
1967 by CBS News as an experiment to enhance the network’s US elec-
tion coverage. Since the early 1980s, these polls have become a fixture
of US election night coverage, a regular feature in most other Western
political systems and, more recently, an independent check on electoral
integrity in fragile democracies such as Venezuela, Mexico, Georgia and
the Ukraine.1
Given their ubiquity elsewhere, why has exit polling not been intro-
duced in the Canadian context? While a combination of factors is rele-
vant here, clearly the economic consideration is paramount. With the need
to staff hundreds of geographically dispersed polling locations at the same
time, exit polls, by their nature, are labour-intensive and pose formidable
logistical challenges to organizers. Indeed, in the US, the crushing expense
of mounting exit polls in presidential election years has forced the highly
competitive mass media industry to pool their resources for collecting
election day data.2 Not surprisingly, then, in a country like Canada, with
its regional diversity, its relatively sparse population, and its much smaller
national media, the economics of mounting a poll of this kind has so far
presented an insurmountable obstacle.3
An argument can be made that the venture warrants renewed atten-
tion. While exit polls are attractive to the mass media because they pro-
vide the basis for instantaneous election day analysis for their evening
coverage, immediacy is neither their only nor even their most valuable
feature. For those studying electoral behaviour, exit polls have three advan-
tages over pre- and post-election research designs: they effectively screen
nonvoters out of the sample,4 they facilitate access to traditionally hard-
to-contact populations, and they tap the decision calculus of voters vir-
tually at the time of the decision itself. Because of these features, exit
polls have served as a very useful complement to data collected through
more conventional designs ~Butler, 1996!. Working from this premise, a
research team at Wilfrid Laurier University experimented with an exit
poll during the 2003 Ontario provincial election to assess the feasibility
of mounting such a venture on a larger scale. This paper describes that
experiment and assesses its success.
Description of the Experiment
Given limited resources, the research team settled on a survey design
that was based on student volunteer assistance and was limited to one
constituency.5 The constituency of Kitchener Centre was selected for the
exercise. In part, it was selected because it is geographically compact
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and proximal to the campus of Wilfrid Laurier University ~within five
kilometres!. However, it was selected as well because it is an excellent
bellwether constituency for both federal and provincial elections—indeed,
as a bellwether, it ranks second in accuracy among all of Ontario’s 103
constituencies.6
The team adopted a two-stage sampling design. The primary sam-
pling unit for the study was the “polling location.” A polling location is
a physical structure—usually a school, church or community centre—
housing a cluster of between two and seven polls from the surrounding
area. Sixteen of 176 polling locations in the constituency were initially
selected, and these were selected purposively rather than randomly. The
main criteria for selection were ~1! partisan representativeness in that each
party’s vote in the previous provincial election had not varied at that loca-
tion by more than 5 per cent from the overall constituency average; and
~2! size of registered electorate, in that more populous stations were pre-
ferred over smaller and more remote locations. The number of registered
Abstract. Although exit polling has not been used to study Canadian elections before, such
polls have methodological features that make them a potentially useful complement to data
collected through more conventional designs. This paper reports on an experiment with exit
polling in one constituency in the 2003 Ontario provincial election. Using student volunteers, a
research team at Wilfrid Laurier University conducted an exit poll in the bellwether constitu-
ency of Kitchener Centre to assess the feasibility of mounting this kind of study on a broader
scale. The experiment was successful in a number of respects. It produced a sample of 653
voters that broadly reflected the partisan character of the constituency, and which can hence be
used to shed light on patterns of vote-switching and voter motivations in that constituency. It
also yielded insights about best practices in mounting an exit poll in the Ontario context, as
well as about the potential for using wireless communication devices to transmit respondent
data from the field. The researchers conclude that exit polling on a limited basis ~selected con-
stituencies! is feasible, but the costs and logistics associated with this methodology make a
province-wide or country-wide study unsupportable at present.
Résumé. Bien que les sondages «sortie des urnes» n’aient pas été utilisés jusqu’ici dans l’étude
des élections au Canada, de tels sondages possèdent certaines caractéristiques qui en font un
complément potentiellement très utile des méthodes plus traditionnelles de cueillette des don-
nées. Cet article rend compte d’un sondage «sortie des urnes» expérimental effectué dans une
circonscription lors de l’élection provinciale de 2003 en Ontario. Utilisant des bénévoles étu-
diants, une équipe de recherche de l’Université Wilfrid Laurier a conduit un sondage «sortie
des urnes» à Kitchener Centre, une circonscription indicatrice de tendance, afin de déterminer
la faisabilité de ce type d’étude au niveau fédéral. L’expérience a réussi à plusieurs égards. Elle
a fourni un échantillon de 653 électeurs qui reflétaient en gros le caractère partisan de la cir-
conscription, ce qui a rendu possible l’étude des motivations des électeurs et des revirements de
vote dans la région. L’expérience a aussi fourni des renseignements sur les pratiques exem-
plaires concernant l’utilisation des sondages «sortie des urnes» au niveau provincial, ainsi que
sur la possibilité d’employer des techniques de communication sans fil pour transmettre les
données recueillies des répondants. Les chercheurs ont conclu que les sondages «sortie des
urnes» sont réalisables dans un cadre restreint, dans certaines circonscriptions sélectionnées,
mais que les coûts et la logistique nécessités par cette méthodologie la rendent actuellement
impraticable pour une étude à l’échelle provinciale ou nationale.
voters at these 16 locations ranged from 1100 to 2520 in the previous
1999 election. From these 16 initial selections, ten sites were designated
as primary selections. The other six locations were designated as alter-
nates, to be used if a primary selection proved inappropriate for some
reason. Within each polling location, respondents were selected using sys-
tematic random sampling. Interviewers were instructed to select every
seventh voter emerging from the polling location, or every fourth voter
following a refusal.
Each polling location was assigned a polling captain, and a pair of
two-person interview teams to split the 11-hour polling period into two
shifts. This meant that 50 students were employed ~5 per location! in
addition to the supervisory role of academic researchers. None of the
staff were financially compensated, but many of the participating stu-
dents wrote a report based on their experience for some course credit.
The questionnaire was intentionally brief ~13 questions occupying
one side of one page!, and timed to be completed within a two-minute
period. Handheld wireless communication devices were provided to each
of the ten teams, so that results could be transmitted regularly to a cen-
tral database housed on campus.7
For the most part, the exit poll conducted on election day ~October
3rd, 2003! unfolded according to this design. The student interview teams
were deployed to their assigned stations in a timely fashion and rapid
communication of the interview data from the field by e-mail allowed us
to build a data file through the day.8 After the polls closed at 8 p.m., the
results were made available online and to the media.
Apart from unseasonably cool weather and some morning precipita-
tion, the biggest obstacle on election day was the resistance put up by
Elections Ontario, the province’s agency responsible for the administra-
tion of elections. In research based on US exit polls, “interviewing posi-
tion,” among all election day factors, has been found to have the strongest
effect on response rates ~Merkle and Edelman, 2002!. It affects both
“miss” rates and refusal rates. Accordingly, the research team contacted
Elections Ontario almost three months before the election to alert offi-
cials of its research intentions and to provide reassurance that interview-
ers would not interfere with voters in the exercise of their franchise.
The agency’s response on election day was to maximize the obsta-
cles the field teams faced in attempting to contact exiting voters. We had
instructed our interviewers to stay outside the building, and to approach
voters as they left for the adjoining parking lot or street. Elections Ontario
based its concern with this procedure on provisions of the Elections Act,
and in particular, section 42 concerning voter privacy. Elections Ontario
took the position that contact with electors anywhere on the property of
the polling place—whether those electors were entering or departing—
constituted voter interference and therefore was not permitted.
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As a consequence of persistent objections by returning officers and,
in some cases, threats of legal action, many of our teams were forced to
take up positions on sidewalks well away from building exits and well
away from parking lots. The tenacity of Elections Ontario officials in
enforcing this regimen varied from one polling location to the next, and
the geographic layout of particular polling locations gave some teams
more reliable access to voters than it did to others. In two cases, the
zealousness of election officials forced the team to substitute alternate
polling locations for the sites originally selected.
Clearly, the stance adopted by Elections Ontario undermined our sam-
pling procedure because interviewers were frequently denied systematic
access to the potential population, leading to missed selections. Our design
called for a sampling interval of every 7th voter or about 14 per cent of
the voting population at these polling locations. In fact, our actual sam-
pling interval averaged about every 10th voter or 10 per cent of the vot-
ing population at these locations. In all, 653 interviews were completed
over the day.
The Results
Participation in the Survey
As noted, exit polls have a number of advantages over other more con-
ventional survey designs. However, these design strengths are of little
value if voters refuse to cooperate. As they left their respective polling
locations, how did voters in this Ontario constituency respond to our inter-
viewers’ requests?
About two of every three voters ~64.8 per cent! who were approached
by our interviewers agreed to complete the survey; however, the effec-
tive participation rate was somewhat lower at 57.2 per cent, because some
respondents who agreed to the interview declined to reveal their vote
direction. This result is comparable to participation rates in most US exit
polls ~Mitofsky, 1991; Mitofsky and Edelman, 1993; but see also Bishop
and Fisher, 1995; Busch and Lieske, 1985!. In 2004, for example, the
comparable overall completion rate for the US exit poll was 59.8 per
cent9 ~Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International, 2005!. On the
one hand, then, our results are promising because they suggest that
Canadians—or at least the voters of Kitchener Centre—are as receptive
to this methodology as voters in the US, where a successful track record
has been established. On the other hand, our participation rate pales in
comparison with some European experiences. In Germany, for example,
response rates have regularly topped 70 per cent ~Hofrichter, 1999! in
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recent elections, and Curtice and Payne ~1995! suggest that the British
rates are even higher than that.
What do we know about those who refused? To assist in analyzing
participation rates, interviewers were asked to code three visible attributes
of all refusals: their apparent age group ~under 30, 30–64, over 65!, their
gender, and whether they were a member of a visible minority.10 From
the interviewer cover sheets, we were also able to determine the gender
of the interviewer and the time of vote.
Table 1 compares the refusal rates for different demographic group-
ings and for different interview situations. The table shows that age and
time of vote are both significantly related to participation, but that gen-
der of respondent and gender of interviewer are not. The age differences
are the most dramatic of these, with co-operation rates falling steadily
from about 80 per cent for the youngest cohort to 40 per cent among
those over 65 years. An age-refusal relationship has been observed by
others in exit poll situations ~Merkle and Edelman, 2002; Edison Media
Research and Mitofsky International, 2005!, but the strength of the rela-
tionship here is quite striking. Examination of the differences suggests
TABLE 1
Participation Rates for Age, Gender, Time of Day, and Interviewer
Gender
Full
participants
Refused
vote
Full
refusals Total
Agec Under 30 years 80.6% 4.0 15.4 100% ~175!
31–64 years 57.7% 5.4 36.9 100% ~574!
65 or older 39.8% 9.2 51.0 100% ~206!
Gendera Male 59.9% 6.7 33.4 100% ~509!
Female 54.9% 7.8 35.2 100% ~459!
Time of interviewc Before 4:00 p.m. 48.6% 8.2 43.2 100% ~486!
After 4:00 p.m. 65.8% 6.9 27.3 100% ~491!
Gender of interviewera Male interviewer 56.2% 8.2 35.6 100% ~523!
Female interviewer 56.3% 6.3 37.5 100% ~400!
Participation rates by gender of respondent and by gender of interviewer
Male interviewera Male respondent 57.9% 7.1 35.0 100% ~280!
Female respondent 54.9% 9.3 35.9 100% ~237!
Female interviewera Male respondent 59.7% 6.5 33.8 100% ~201!
Female respondent 53.3% 5.1 41.6 100% ~197!
Participation rates by time of day and by respondent age
Under 30 yearsa Before 4:00 p.m. 74.5% 3.6 21.8 100% ~55!
After 4:00 p.m. 83.3% 4.2 12.5 100% ~120!
31–64 yearsa Before 4:00 p.m. 48.8% 5.3 45.9 100% ~246!
After 4:00 p.m. 64.3% 5.5 30.2 100% ~328!
65 or oldera Before 4:00 p.m. 42.1% 8.2 49.7 100% ~171!
After 4:00 p.m. 28.6% 14.3 57.1 100% ~35!
Based on chi square tests within each subtable, a: not significant, b: p , .05, c: p , .01.
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that the relationship was stronger because the youngest age group in our
constituency was considerably more co-operative ~at 81 per cent! than
US respondents of the same age ~whose response rate averages between
55 per cent and 58 per cent!, and the older cohort ~at 40 per cent! was
somewhat less co-operative than its US counterpart ~with average response
rates between 43 per cent and 46 per cent!. Was this a function of the
greater rapport that our young interviewers could establish with those
closer to their age? Merkle and Edelman ~2002! tested such a hypoth-
esis, but found no support for it ~for young voters!. Interestingly, they
did find age-of-interviewer effects for the oldest age cohort in that older
voters were significantly more co-operative when approached by a middle-
aged interviewer. Given the lack of age variation among interviewers in
our experiment, we are not in a position to test this further.
There is also a significant increase in co-operation after 4:00 p.m.
While there might be reason to suspect that this “time of vote” relation-
ship is spurious—after all, most senior citizens voted before 4:00 p.m.
and seniors were generally less co-operative with our interviewers—
Table 1 indicates that even when age of respondent is controlled, these
time differences persist, at least for the mid-age group. The participation
rate for the oldest age cohort may actually have decreased after 4:00 p.m.,
although not enough to attain statistical significance.
What might account for the general increase in co-operation as the
day wore on? One possibility is that our student interviewers simply gained
experience and technique through the day. However, this seems unlikely
because there were two separate shifts and a step function breaking at
the 3:00–4:00 p.m. mark seems to describe the data more effectively ~see
Figure 1!.
Another possibility is that interviewers encountered a somewhat dif-
ferent type of voter in the post-4:00 p.m. period. For example, research-
ers in US exit polls have found that employment status distinguishes voters
in different time periods over the day ~Bush and Lieske, 1985; Fuchs and
FIGURE 1
Participation rates across the day ~9:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.!
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Becker, 1968; Klorman, 1976!. Perhaps not surprisingly, those who are
most time constrained—that is, those who have regular employment out-
side the home—tend to vote after work. Employment might affect par-
ticipation in two ways. First, it may be that those who are more involved
outside the home also feel more comfortable interacting with the likes of
our young student interviewers. Such a “comfort factor”—what others
have called the “social isolation” hypothesis ~Groves and Couper, 1998;
Merkle and Edelman, 2002!—might help to explain both the greater ret-
icence of older voters to participate in our survey as well as this higher
participation rate among late afternoon and early evening voters. Sec-
ond, it may be that those who are employed but who are able to slip out
to vote during the day may be less inclined to co-operate simply because
they must rush to return to work.11
Accuracy of the Poll
One of the strongest selling points for conducting an exit poll lies with its
capacity to generate an accurate profile of the behaviour and perspectives
of those determining the election outcome. Compared to pre- and post-
election surveys, there are fewer factors that can intervene to distort a pic-
ture of the electorate’s decision and decision-making rationale. Because
the accuracy of such polls is a central justification for their considerable
cost, it is important to assess the success of our experiment by this measure.
We do not have population values for the voting public for most vari-
ables in the constituency of Kitchener-Centre, but we do have such param-
eters for party support levels in both the 2003 and the previous 1999
provincial elections. How well did our sample estimate these support lev-
els? Table 2 compares the sample and population distributions for the
two elections. The table shows that, when asked to recall their vote from
the previous 1999 election, our sample performs quite well at estimating
TABLE 2
Comparison of Exit Poll Results with Actual Constituency Results
Party
2003
Actual
2003
Sample
1999
Actual
1999
Sample
Liberal party 42.6% 47.9% 39.9% 37.6%
Progressive Conservative party 37.6% 35.7% 50.2% 50.1%
New Democratic party 15.8% 14.4% 7.8% 10.0%
Other 4.0% 2.0% 2.2% 1.8%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
~N  555! ~N  452!
X2 Goodness of Fit Test X2  9.80, df  3, p , .05 X2  3.74 df  3, p . .20
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actual support levels in that earlier contest; however, our sample does
not fare as well at estimating the 2003 election result in Kitchener Cen-
tre. Specifically, our sample overestimates the 2003 Liberal vote by about
5 per cent, and underestimates the Progressive Conservative and “other”
party votes each by about 2 per cent. Because departures this large are
unlikely to be the result of chance variation, we must consider other pos-
sible explanatory factors. There are several candidates here.
The first two of these concern possible sampling problems: one, that
the polling locations we selected may not adequately represent the con-
stituency; or two, that differential completion rates across the ten polling
locations created an unrepresentative sample of our polling location pop-
ulation. We examined our sample with a view to assessing the impor-
tance of these factors. First, we established that our ten polling locations
are a very representative subsample of the constituency as a whole. Esti-
mates based on this subsample do not deviate from the constituency results
by more than a percentage point for any of the four party groups and what
small deviations there are here are in the wrong direction to account for
our over-report. If our sample of polling locations accurately reflects the
larger constituency, could it be that our sample of that population over-
weights some polling locations and underweights others? That is, were dis-
tortions introduced because some interview teams had higher completion
rates than others and those teams happened to be in Liberal strongholds?
To examine this possibility, we compared the proportion of respondents
that we should have drawn from each polling location with the propor-
tion that we did in fact draw. As we might anticipate, there are modest
deviations here, some as large as .04 or 4 per cent. However, reweighting
our sample to correct for these disproportions does not correct for the dis-
tortions in our original sample—indeed, it actually accentuates them by
about 1 per cent for most parties.
If our sample of polling locations is representative, and our sample
of respondents is not disproportionately drawn from those locations, then
we must suspect that the problem lies with the selection process in the
field. An obvious candidate here is the age differential in refusal rates
noted above. If older voters are more likely to have been Progressive
Conservative party supporters in recent elections ~and they are!, and older
voters are also more resistant to switching in this “change” election ~a
plausible hypothesis!, then the under-representation of older voters in
our sample might explain the under-representation of PC votes and
the over-representation of Liberal ones. However, our test of the under-
lying assumptions here yielded only a modest age-vote relationship, and
one due largely to the decidedly pro-Liberal leaning of the youngest
cohort. There were no substantial differences in the voting direction or
in the propensity to shift between the “over 30” and “over 65” cohorts.
Not surprisingly, then, reweighting the sample to correct for the age
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maldistribution had almost no impact on the vote distribution of our sam-
ple. Similarly, reweighting to make our sample representative on the “time
of vote” variable had no impact on our estimates.
Given our lack of success after reweighting, and given our data lim-
itations, we are left only with conjectures about the source of the distor-
tion in our sample. Two possibilities suggest themselves. Either voters
misreported their vote to our interviewers or Liberal voters were simply
more willing to reveal their preference to us. Although hard evidence is
difficult to come by, both have been suspected in cases of recent US and
British exit poll distortions ~Traugott and Price, 1992; Curtice and Payne,
1995!. Most recently, organizers of the 2004 US presidential exit poll
have concluded that, for reasons unknown, Democratic party supporters
were generally more willing to be interviewed than Republican voters,
leading to an over-estimate of Kerry support nationally of 6.5 per cent
~Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International, 2005!.
This would seem to be the most plausible explanation in the Kitch-
ener Centre case. The 2003 Ontario provincial election campaign was
not a very close election in that both polls and pundits were predicting
from the outset the defeat of the incumbent Progressive Conservative gov-
ernment by the Liberals. It may be that this prevailing climate of opinion
put some PC voters in a less cooperative mood, knowing that they had
just backed a losing candidate. Clearly, there is a need for more investi-
gation of the impact of “political” factors on the willingness of voters to
participate in exit polls.
Time of Day and the Vote
Although the exit poll provided us with a unique opportunity to forecast
the results of the 2003 election in Kitchener Centre, this dividend was of
short term-benefit. The long-term benefits of the survey lie in our ability
to analyze the behaviour of Ontario voters in a provincial election. One
of the questions that exit polls are uniquely suited to answer concerns
the time of day that different groups of people vote. What little compar-
ative research there is on this question suggests that there are indeed sys-
tematic differences in the electorates that vote at different times of the
day ~Busch and Lieske, 1985; Fuchs and Becker, 1968; Mendelsohn and
Crespi, 1970; but see also Klorman, 1976!. For the most part, the differ-
ences centre on employment status and variables correlated with it. Table 3
tests this idea by partitioning the sample into three time frames: 9–noon,
12–4 p.m. and 4–8 p.m., and displaying their socio-political profiles.
Table 3 suggests that distinct voter profiles are associated with each
of the three time periods, but that the greatest contrast is between the “eve-
ning” cohort and the two “daytime” cohorts. The distinctions are drawn
most sharply on the variables of occupation and age, but to a lesser extent
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on gender. As we have been led to expect from the literature, the daytime
cohorts are over-represented by those whose time commitments tend to be
most flexible—the retired, homemakers, and those who are unemployed.
Probably as a consequence, the daytime profiles are also over-represented
by those over 65, and, to a less extent, by women. Conversely, the evening
cohort is over-represented by those who are likely to have daytime job
commitments. Interestingly, the differences in cohorts does not extend
reliably to their voting profiles; while there is a hint of Liberal over-
representation and PC under-representation in the evening cohort, the pat-
tern is not sufficiently distinct to attain statistical significance.
Conclusion
While the exit poll represents a potentially useful tool for those studying
voting behaviour, the technique has not until now been deployed in a
TABLE 3
Comparison of Voters’ Socio-Political Profiles for
Three Time Periods of the Day
Morning
electorate
9–noon
~N  117!
Afternoon
electorate
12–4 p.m.
~N  160!
Evening
electorate
4–8 p.m.
~N  276!
Vote in 2003a Liberal 44.4% 44.4% 50.4%
PC 41.0 40.6 32.2
NDP 12.8 14.4 14.9
Other 1.7 .6 2.5
Agec Under 35 12.1 19.3 30.0
35–64 years 46.8 53.5 65.7
65 or over 41.1 27.3 4.3
Genderb Male 47.6 49.8 56.8
Female 52.4 50.2 43.2
Own residence ~or not!?a 78.6 71.3 67.8
Belong to union ~or not!?a 42.5 43.1 38.6
Married ~or not!?a 63.5 55.0 65.2
Occupationc
Professional0manager 24.4 19.8 45.2
Clerical0sales 3.9 7.0 12.2
Skilled labour 11.8 17.1 16.1
Unskilled labour 3.9 7.0 10.0
Homemaker 4.7 5.3 3.0
Unemployed 3.1 2.1 1.1
Student 3.1 7.5 5.4
Retired 44.9 34.2 7.0
Based on a chi square test within each subtable, a: not significant,
b: p , .05, c: p , .01.
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Canadian electoral context. Our experiment with the methodology in one
Ontario constituency yields a number of observations and insights that
may be of use to others considering the technique.
First, we found that election day polls of this kind are feasible and
not exorbitantly expensive when the population is confined to a modest
geographic unit ~like a constituency!. While we employed a volunteer staff
of about 60 for Kitchener-Centre, that number could easily be halved if
the staff were compensated for their day’s work and the teams stream-
lined. By the same token, our experiment suggests that a broader exit poll
project encompassing the province or the country would pose unaccept-
able logistical and economic challenges for researchers. For those con-
templating a broader project, a selection of constituency studies across the
province or country would seem to be the only feasible option.
Second, it appears that the electorate is not unduly resistant to the
methodology. To be sure, over a third of those approached by our inter-
viewers declined to participate, and the refusal rate was much higher for
those over 65. However, these response rates are not radically different
from those experienced in the US. Moreover, our interviewing staff was
comprised entirely of young people, the interviewer age group that US
studies have found has the weakest response rates ~Edison Media Research
and Mitofsky International, 2005!. This suggests that response rates could
be improved if a more age-diverse field staff was employed.
Third, the data collected through this exit poll was useful in that it
generated a sample of respondents who seem to represent the partisan
character of the constituency, and hence, whose responses can be used to
shed light on patterns of vote-switching and voter motivations for this
constituency in this election ~Brown, Docherty et al., 2004!. To be cau-
tious, we limited the interview to about two minutes so as not to jeopar-
dize response rates, but our experience suggests that an interview of twice
that length ~collecting twice the information! would be feasible.
Fourth, we chose procedurally to administer the questionnaire orally
to respondents, to record their responses on hard copy and to transmit
the pre-coded responses from the field using handheld wireless devices.
In general, the system worked well and we would make only one modest
change in a subsequent experiment. Drawing on US experience, we would
allow respondents to fill out the questionnaire themselves, and to deposit
the completed questionnaire in a “ballot box” on site. Research in the
US suggests that this added step tends to enhance the willingness of vot-
ers to participate in the poll ~Bishop and Fisher, 1995; Levy, 1983!.
Finally, the most vexing problem we confronted in Kitchener Centre
was restricted access to voters due to the stiff opposition of Elections
Ontario staff. While the sample of respondents we interviewed through
the day closely resembled the partisan parameters of the electorate, the
varying conditions interviewers encountered at different polling stations
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clearly contributed to nonsampling error in ways that are difficult to
assess. This problem needs to be addressed in future studies, ideally
through negotiations with election authorities.
Notes
1 For a brief overview of the development of exit polling and the conventional meth-
odologies employed, see Hofrichter ~1999!.
2 For the 2004 US presidential election, the National Election Pool ~NEP!, a consor-
tium of six television networks, conducted exit polls in about 1480 precincts through-
out the country, employing a staff of more than 5,000. For a description of the exit
poll methodology they employed in this election, see NEP ~2004!.
3 While “exit polls,” as the term is conventionally used, have not been introduced into
Canada, polling organizations in the 2004 and 2006 Canadian federal elections have
been experimenting with election day telephone and online surveys. In 2004, for exam-
ple, COMPAS Research conducted a 1000-respondent survey of Canadians which
was used by CanWest Global as part of its election night programming. In 2006,
CanWest Global used an Ipsos-Reid Internet panel of 35,000 reported voters to sup-
plement its election night coverage.
4 It should be acknowledged that they screen out “early” and “absentee” voters as well,
with uncertain implications. In the US, the proportion of voters exercising their fran-
chise through “early” and “absentee” channels has been estimated at 15 per cent of
all voters. The problem is further complicated by the fact that “early” and “absentee”
voters frequently do not reflect the partisan split on election day ~Konner, 2003, Langer,
2004!. As a consequence, in 2004, the National Election Pool supplemented their
exit polling with prior telephone surveys in 13 states with high proportions of such
voters. Although no systematic study has been conducted, fragmentary evidence sug-
gests that those voting in “advance polls” in Canada is a much smaller proportion of
the voting population than in the US, and ~with the possible exception of the 2004
federal election! usually mirror the voting day partisan division. In Kitchener Centre
in the previous 1999 provincial election, for example, the proportion of the vote cast
at the “advance poll” was about 3.8 per cent of the total.
5 Several months prior to the 2003 Ontario provincial election, the research team
approached a number of potential media partners with a proposal to run an exit poll
in five or six representative constituencies on election day. This exercise would serve
as a pilot study for a more ambitious project to be undertaken for the national elec-
tion expected in the spring of 2004. However, the estimated costs for each of these
projects made the idea too expensive to be commercially viable for the media.
6 Ontario is the only province in which federal and provincial electoral boundaries are
identical. In the recent past, only the constituency of Stoney Creek near Hamilton
has a better bellwether record than Kitchener Centre.
7 The Blackberry wireless handheld devices were supplied by the Waterloo-based firm,
Research in Motion. Use of the devices allowed for constant wireless e-mail commu-
nication between the field and the university.
8 Initially, the research team intended to use the Blackberry handheld devices directly
in the interview process, with the interviewer reading the questions from the screen
and keying in the responses. However, pre-tests revealed that this procedure was too
distracting for both interviewer and respondent, too prone to error under field condi-
tions, and might raise issues of voter trust in this methodology. As a more practical
alternative, interviewers administered a one-page hard copy questionnaire, and trans-
mitted the pre-coded responses as an e-mail message back to a campus computer.
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9 The completion rate reported by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International
was 53.2 per cent, but the base for this percentage includes “missed” respondents—
that is, respondents who should have been contacted, but who, for a variety of rea-
sons, were not. The base for the Kitchener Centre response rate is limited to
respondents who were actually invited to participate. It should be noted that US
response rates have been falling steadily from a high of 61 per cent in 1992 to 51 per
cent in the 2000 presidential election ~Konner, 2003!.
10 The “visible minority” variable recorded so little variation in this largely white con-
stituency that it has not been included in the subsequent analysis.
11 We are indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for this latter suggestion.
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